El Consejo acaba de adoptar el duodécimo paquete de sanciones económicas e individuales. Los actos jurídicos correspondientes se publicarán en breve en el Diario Oficial de la UE (aquí).
A continuación te remitimos los comunicados de prensa del Consejo y la Comisión.
Council:
The Council adopted today a twelfth package of economic and individual restrictive measures in view of the continued Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. These measures deliver a further blow to Putin’s ability to wage war by targeting high-value sectors of the Russian economy and making it more difficult to circumvent EU sanctions.With this 12th package, we are putting forward a robust set of new listings and economic measures which will further weaken Russia’s war machine. Our message is clear, as I already stated when I chaired the informal Foreign Affairs Council in Kyiv: we remain steadfast in our commitment to Ukraine and will continue to support its fight for freedom and sovereignty.
The agreed package includes the following measures:
- Diamonds:
The EU is imposing a prohibition on the direct or indirect import, purchase or transfer of diamonds from Russia. This prohibition applies to diamonds originating in Russia, diamonds exported from Russia, diamonds transiting Russia and Russian diamonds when processed in third countries.A direct ban applies to non-industrial natural and synthetic diamonds as well as diamond jewellery, as of 1 January 2024. Furthermore, an indirect import ban of Russian diamonds when processed (i.e. cut and/or polished) in third countries, including jewellery incorporating diamonds originating in Russia, will be phased in progressively as of 1 March 2024 and be completed by 1 September 2024. This phasing-in of indirect import bans is justified by the need to deploy a traceability mechanism that enables effective enforcement measures and minimises disruptions for the EU market.The ban of Russian diamonds is part of a G7 effort to develop an internationally coordinated diamond ban that aims at depriving Russia of this important revenue source.
- No Russia clause:
Today’s decision requires that EU exporters contractually prohibit re-exportation to Russia and re-exportation for use in Russia of particularly sensitive goods and technology, when selling, supplying, transferring or exporting to a third country, with the exception of partner countries. The clause covers prohibited items used in Russian military systems found on the battlefield in Ukraine or critical to the development, production or use of those Russian military systems, as well as aviation goods and weapons.
- Import-export controls and restrictions:
The Council added 29 new entities to the list of those directly supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex in its war of aggression against Ukraine. They will be subject to tighter export restrictions concerning dual use goods and technologies, as well as goods and technology which might contribute to the technological enhancement of Russia’s defence and security sector. Some of these 29 entities belong to third countries involved in the circumvention of trade restrictions, or are Russian entities involved in the development, production and supply of electronic components for Russia’s military and industrial complex. Furthermore, today’s decision expands the list of restricted items that could contribute to the technological enhancement of Russia’s defence and security sector to include: chemicals, lithium batteries, thermostats, DC motors and servomotors for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), machine tools and machinery parts. Lastly, the EU introduced further restrictions on imports of goods which generate significant revenues for Russia and thereby enable the continuation of its war of aggression against Ukraine, such pig iron and spiegeleisen, copper wires, aluminium wires, foil, tubes and pipes for a total value of €2,2 billion per year. A new import ban is introduced on liquefied propane (LPG) with a 12-month transitional period. Lastly, the Council decided to introduce some exemptions to import restrictions concerning personal use items, such as personal hygiene items, or clothing worn by travellers or contained in their luggage, and for cars that have a diplomatic vehicle registration plate to enter the EU. Additionally, in order to facilitate the entry into the Union of EU citizens living in Russia, member states can authorise the entry of their cars provided that the cars are not for sale and are driven for strictly personal use.
- Enforcement and anti-circumvention measures:
The transit ban that currently applies to dual use goods and technologies exported from the EU to third countries via the territory of Russia will be extended to all battlefield goods. In order to further limit circumvention, today’s decision includes a ban on Russian nationals from owning, controlling or holding any posts on the governing bodies of the legal persons, entities or bodies providing crypto-asset wallet, account or custody services to Russian persons and residents. Additionally, the existing prohibition on the provision of services will be extended to also include the provision of software for the management of enterprises and software for industrial design and manufacture. Lastly the EU is imposing notification requirements for the transfer of funds outside the EU by any entity established in the EU that is owned or controlled by an entity established in Russia, or by a Russian national or natural person residing in Russia.
- Enforcement of oil price cap:
The Council is introducing tighter compliance rules to support the implementation of the oil price cap and clamp down on circumvention. Furthermore a strengthened information sharing mechanism will allow better identification of vessels and entities carrying out deceptive practices, such as ship-to-ship transfers used to conceal the origin or destination of cargo and AIS manipulations, while transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products. The Council also decided to introduce notification rules for the sale of tankers to any third country in order to make more transparent their sale and export, in particular in the case of second-hand carriers that could be used to evade the import ban on Russian crude or petroleum products and the G7 Price Cap.
- Iron and steel:
Today’s decision adds Switzerland to a list of partner countries which apply a set of restrictive measures on imports of iron and steel from Russia, and a set of import control measures that are substantially equivalent to those of the EU. It also extends the wind-down periods for the import of specific steel products.
- Individual listings:
In addition to economic sanctions, the Council decided to list a significant amount of additional individuals and entities.
- Background:
In the European Council conclusions of 26-27 October 2023, the EU reiterated its resolute condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter and reaffirmed the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence against the Russian aggression.The European Union will continue to provide strong financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes. The relevant legal acts will soon be published in the Official Journal of the EU.
COM:
EU adopts 12th package of sanctions against Russia for its continued illegal war against Ukraine
The Commission welcomes the Council’s adoption of a 12th package of sanctions against Russia. The focus of this package is to impose additional import and export bans on Russia, combat sanctions circumvention and close loopholes.
In particular, this package includes additional listings of Russian individuals and companies and new import and export bans – such as banning the export of Russian diamonds to Europe – in very close cooperation with our G7 partners. Moreover, the package tightens the implementation of the oil price cap by monitoring more closely how tankers may be used to circumvent the cap. It also includes stricter asset tracing obligations and tough measures on third-country companies circumventing sanctions.
The 12th package has these key elements:
ADDITIONAL LISTINGS
- Over 140 additional individuals and entities subject to asset freezes. This covers actors in the Russian military and defence, including military industry companies and Private Military Companies. This also includes actors from the IT sector, as well as other important economic actors. The measures also target whose who have orchestrated the recent illegal so-called “elections” in the territories of Ukraine that Russia has temporarily occupied, and those responsible for the forced “re-education” of Ukrainian children, as well as actors spreading disinformation/propaganda in support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
TRADE MEASURES
- Import ban on Russian diamonds: import restrictions on non-industrial diamonds, mined, processed, or produced, in Russia. These proposed sanctions are part of an internationally coordinated G7 diamond ban, aiming to deprive Russia of this important revenue stream estimated at €4 billion per year. All G7 members will implement a direct ban on diamonds exported from Russia at the latest by 1 January 2024. As of 1 March 2024, a ban on Russian diamonds polished in a third country will take effect and, as of 1 September 2024, the ban will be expanded to include lab-grown diamonds, jewellery, and watches containing diamonds. To further the effectiveness of these measures, a robust traceability-based verification and certification mechanism for rough diamonds will be established within the G7.
- Import ban on raw materials for steel production, processed aluminium products and other metal goods: new measures restricting imports from Russia of certain metal goods.
- Export restrictions: additional export restrictions on dual-use and advanced technological and industrial goods worth €2.3 billion per year. In particular:
- New export controls on dual use/advanced tech, aiming to further weaken Russia’s military capabilities, including chemicals, thermostats, DC motors and servomotors for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), machine tools and machinery parts.
- New export bans on EU industrial goods, to further hamper Russia’s capacities in its industrial sector, including machinery and parts, construction-related goods, processed steel, copper and aluminium goods, lasers, and batteries.
- Addition of 29 Russian and third country entities to the list of entities associated to Russia’s military-industrial complex (including entities registered in Uzbekistan and Singapore).
- Prohibition to provide enterprise and design-related software to the Russian government or Russian companies. The aim is to further hamper Russia’s capacities in its industrial sector. Restrictions in the area of services are an area where we have worked closely with our international partners, including the US and the UK.
STRICTER ASSET FREEZE OBLIGATIONS
- New listing criterion: The Council has agreed a new listing criterion to include persons who benefit from the forced transfer of ownership or control over Russian subsidiaries of EU companies. This will ensure that no one profits from the losses that EU companies face when their subsidiaries are forcibly acquired by Russian owners/management.
- Possibility to keep deceased persons on the asset freeze list, in order to prevent the freezing measure from potentially being undermined.
- Tighter obligation for Member States to proactively trace assets of listed persons, in order to prevent and detect instances of breach or circumvention of sanctions.
ENERGY MEASURES
- Oil price cap: To make it more difficult for Russia to sustain the war, we have tightened the international G7+ oil price cap, by introducing new measures to more closely monitor the sale of tankers to third countries, as well as require more detailed attestation requirements. This will help to tackle the ‘shadow fleet’ used by Russia to circumvent the price cap. In this respect, the EU is in close dialogue with our G7 partners to ensure alignment of our measures and future guidance.
- New import ban on liquified petroleum gas (LPG), impacting annual imports worth over €1 billion, with grandfathering of existing contracts for a period of maximum 12 months.
STRONGER ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES
- Broadening of the scope of the transit prohibition through Russia by adding certain economically critical goods when these are intended for export to third countries.
- Obligation for operators to contractually prohibit the re-export of certain categories of sensitive goods to Russia, including goods related to aviation, jet fuel, firearms and goods on the Common High Priority list.
- Introduction of a new measure that will require the notification of certain transfers of funds out of the EU from EU entities directly or indirectly owned by more than 40% by Russians or entities established in Russia.
ADDITIONAL MEASURES
- Introduction of a new derogation to allow for cases in which Member States decide to deprive in the public interest a listed person of funds or economic resources.
- Introduction of a derogation to allow compensation for damages to be paid by a newly listed insurance company.
- Introduction of a derogation to allow the sale of EU companies owned by certain listed individuals or entities.
OTHER
- Inclusion of a technical amendment allowing for the provision of pilot services necessary for maritime safety.
Background
The EU stands firmly with Ukraine and its people, and will continue to strongly support Ukraine’s economy, society, armed forces, and future reconstruction. EU sanctions are at the core of the EU’s response to Russia’s unjustified military aggression against Ukraine, as they degrade Russia’s military and technological capability, cut the country from the most developed global markets, deprive the Kremlin from the revenues it is financing the war with, and impose ever higher costs on Russia’s economy. In this respect, sanctions contribute to fulfilling the EU’s key objective, which is to continue to work for a just and lasting peace, not another frozen conflict. Their effects grow over time as the sanctions erode Russia’s industrial and tech base. The EU also continues to ensure that its sanctions do not impact energy and agrifood exports from Russia to third countries.
As guardian of the EU Treaties, the European Commission monitors the enforcement of EU sanctions by EU Member States.
Anomalous, growing trade figures for some specific products/countries are hard evidence that Russia is actively attempting to circumvent sanctions. This calls for us to redouble our efforts in tackling circumvention and to ask our neighbours for even closer cooperation. EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan continues his outreach to key third countries to combat circumvention. The first tangible results are already visible. Systems are being put in place in some countries for monitoring, controlling, and blocking re-exports. Working with like-minded partners, we have also agreed a list of Common High Priority sanctioned goods to which businesses should apply particular due diligence and which third countries must not re-export to Russia. In addition, within the EU, we have also drawn up a list of sanctioned goods that are economically critical and on which businesses and third countries should be especially vigilant.